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exchanger could not have the replacement property built on land 
already owned by the exchanger.18
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property.
 Leasehold property. Real property may be exchanged for a 
leasehold with 30 years or more to run. The like-kind statute 
does not provide guidance on exchanging leasehold interests.9 
However, the regulations issued in 1956 dealt explicitly with the 
issue.10 Under those regulations, “. . . no gain or loss is recognized 
. . . [if] a taxpayer who is not a dealer in real estate exchanges 
city real estate for a ranch or farm, or exchanges a leasehold with 
30-years or more to run for real estate, or exchanges improved 
real estate for unimproved real estate.” 
 In a 2013 Tax Court decision, VIP’s Industries, Inc. & Subs. 
v. Commissioner,11 VIP operated several wholly-owned and 
majority-owned entities engaged in owning and operating hotels, 
motels, restaurants and hospitality ventures and also invested in 
real estate. The lease in question, which figured into a like-kind 
exchange, was originally a 33-year lease on real properties but, at 
the time of the exchange, the lease had 21 years and four months 
remaining. The taxpayer argued that the “30-year” requirement 
was only a “safe harbor” and did not preclude shorter terms for 
leases of real property under the regulations. The Tax Court, 
however, disagreed and denied like-kind exchange treatment, 
stating that it was settled law, not a mere “safe harbor.”
 A sale followed by a leaseback involving terms of 30 years or 
more constitutes a like-kind exchange.12
 A conservation easement or development rights to maintain 
property in an undeveloped state around major cities have been 
held to be eligible for a like-kind exchange with a fee simple 
interest in real estate.13 An exchange of land containing sand 
deposits has been held to be like-kind with other real estate even 
though the taxpayers owning the land had mined sand from the 
property.14
 A purchaser’s rights under an installment land contract were 
considered equivalent to a fee simple interest.15
 The exchange of real property for other real property with the 
owner of the other real property required to construct a building 
to the transferor’s specifications has qualified as a tax-free, like-
kind exchange.16 However, only the portion completed prior to 
the closing qualifies as like-kind.17 In an earlier litigated case, the 
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ANImALS
 CATTLE. The plaintiff incurred damage to the plaintiff’s truck 
when it struck several cattle which were owned by the defendant 
and which had escaped from their pasture. The evidence indicated 
that the cattle had broken through a chained gate. The plaintiff 
sued for damages, alleging either that the defendant was negligent 
in maintaining the gate or that the defendant was statutorily liable 
for violating Wis. Stat. § 172.015 which prohibits allowing cattle 
to run at large on public highways. The defendant testified as to 
the efforts taken to secure the cattle and maintain the fence and 
gates. Because the plaintiff did not present any contradicting 
evidence, the court held that the defendant was not negligent. The 
court noted that Wis. Stat. § 172.015 provides that “No livestock 
shall run at large on a highway at any time except to go from 
one farm parcel to another. If the owner or keeper of livestock 
knowingly permits livestock to run at large on a highway, except 
when going from one farm parcel to another, and after notice by 
the date that is 9 months after the decedent’s date of death or the last 
day of the period covered by an extension. The decedent’s estate 
did not file a timely Form 706 to make the portability election. The 
estate discovered its failure to elect portability after the due date 
for making the election. The estate represented that the value of the 
decedent’s gross estate was less than the basic exclusion amount 
in the year of the decedent’s death and that during the decedent’s 
lifetime, the decedent made no taxable gifts. The estate requested 
an extension of time pursuant to Treas. Reg. § 301.9100-3 to elect 
portability of the decedent’s DSUE amount pursuant to I.R.C. § 
2010(c)(5)(A). The IRS granted the estate an extension of time to 
file Form 706 with the election. Ltr. Rul. 201617003, Jan. 14, 
2016; Ltr. Rul. 201618004, Jan. 22, 2016; Ltr. Rul. 201618005, 
Jan. 14, 2016; Ltr. Rul. 201618006, Jan. 15, 2016; Ltr. Rul. 
201618009, Jan. 12, 2016.
 TRUSTS. The taxpayer was a trustee of a trust which failed 
to pay taxes over several years. The IRS sent the trustee a lien 
notice and the trustee requested a collection due process hearing 
to appeal the lien notice. The trustee did not challenge the amount 
of tax involved but argued that the trust was not subject to levy 
under I.R.C. § 6331. The trustee reasoned that the Internal Revenue 
Code was not “positive law” but only a restatement of enacted 
statutes. Thus, the definition of “person” in I.R.C. § 6331 must be 
interpreted in light of the prior law under Section 3310 of the 1939 
Internal Revenue Code which was created by statute. Under the 
1939 law, a trust was not a person. The court rejected this argument 
as frivolous  in that the Internal Revenue Code is positive law in 
that it was enacted and amended by Congress. The court held that 
I.R.C. § 6331 includes trusts in its definition of persons subject to 
levy. Wilson Heirs Trust v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2016-76.
FEDERAL INCOmE 
TAxATION
 ACCOUNTING mETHOD. The IRS has issued a revenue 
procedure which provides the List of Automatic Changes to which 
apply the automatic change procedures in Rev. Proc. 2015-13, 
2015-1 C.B. 419, as clarified and modified by Rev. Proc. 2015-33, 
2015-1 C.B. 1067. Among the list is a change where a taxpayer 
wants to change its method of accounting for loans received from 
the Commodity Credit Corporation from including the loan amount 
in gross income for the taxable year in which each loan is received 
to treating each loan amount as a loan Rev. Proc. 2016-29, I.R.B. 
2016-21.
 AmERICAN OPPORTUNITY  CREDIT. The taxpayer 
was enrolled full time at a university during 2010 and 2011. In 
November 2010 the taxpayer enrolled for the spring 2011 classes 
and the university billed the taxpayer for the 2011 classes based 
on the classes listed. In January 2011, the university billed for 
additional classes. Later in January 2011, the taxpayer’s university 
bills were paid by student loan proceeds granted at that time. The 
university filed Form 1098-T, Tuition Statement, for 2011 and 
included only the January 2011 charges in Box 2, “Amounts billed 
for qualified tuition and related expenses.” The taxpayer filed on 
any peace officer fails to remove the livestock from the highway, 
the owner or keeper may be fined not more than $200.” Because 
there was no evidence that the defendant had actual knowledge 
of the cattle on the highway and had not been notified by a peace 
officer that the cattle were loose, the defendant did not violate Wis. 
Stat. § 172.015. The court noted a failure of the plaintiff’s counsel 
to adequately discuss the legal issues involved in the case. Kurtz 
v. marek, 2016 Wisc. App. LExIS 124 (Wisc. Ct. App. 2016).
BANKRUPTCY
CHAPTER 12
 ExECUTORY CONTRACTS. The debtor was a farmer and 
owner of an auto repair shop. The auto repair shop was leased to 
a third party under an oral lease. The debtor owned farm land and 
also leased farmland from an unrelated party and the estate of the 
debtor’s mother. One of the leases was written but, in accordance 
with the practice in the area, the farm leases were oral. The debtor 
sought to assume all the leases and a creditor objected. The debtor 
testified as to the terms of the oral leases which had been in effect 
for several years. The debtor also had contracts with the Farm 
Service Agency for farm program payments. The debtor provided 
uncontroverted testimony that all the leases and contracts would 
benefit the bankruptcy estate. Thus, the court held that the debtor 
could assume all the contracts over the objection of the creditors. 
In re miller, 2016 Bankr. LExIS 1046 (Bankr. D. mont. 2016).
FEDERAL FARm
PROGRAmS
 FARm LOANS. The CCC has adopted as final regulations which 
amend the Farm Storage Facility Loan Program (FSFL) regulations 
to add eligibility for portable storage structures, portable equipment, 
and storage and handling trucks, and to reduce the down payment 
and documentation requirements for a new “microloan” category 
of FSFLs up to $50,000. These changes are intended to address 
the needs of smaller farms and specialty crop producers.  81 Fed. 
Reg. 25587 (April 29, 2016).
 FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAxATION
 PORTABILITY. The decedent died, survived by a spouse, on a 
date after the effective date of the amendment of I.R.C. § 2010(c), 
which provides for portability of a “deceased spousal unused 
exclusion” (DSUE) amount to a surviving spouse. To obtain the 
benefit of portability of the decedent’s DSUE amount to the spouse, 
the decedent’s estate was required to file Form 706, United States 
Estate (and Generation-Skipping Transfer) Tax Return, on or before 
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the cash basis and claimed the American Opportunity Credit based 
on the full tuition and fees for 2011. The IRS disallowed the credit 
based on the university’s 2011 Form 1098-T. The court held that 
the credit was improperly denied because the 2011 tuition was not 
paid until the loan proceeds were applied to the tuition in January 
2011. Terrell v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2016-85.
 APPLICABLE FEDERAL INTEREST RATES. The IRS 
has adopted as final regulations that provide the method to be 
used to adjust the applicable federal rates (AFRs) under I.R.C. 
§ 1288 for tax-exempt obligations and the method to be used to 
determine the long-term tax-exempt rate and the adjusted federal 
long-term rate under I.R.C. § 382. For tax-exempt obligations, the 
final regulations affect the determination of original issue discount 
under I.R.C. § 1273 and of total unstated interest under I.R.C. § 
483. In addition, the final regulations affect the determination of 
the limitations under I.R.C. §§ 382 and 383 on the use of certain 
operating loss carryforwards, tax credits, and other attributes of 
corporations following ownership changes.  I.R.C. § 1274(d) directs 
the Secretary to determine the AFRs that are used for determining 
the imputed principal amount of debt instruments to which I.R.C. 
§ 1274 applies, computing total unstated interest on payments to 
which I.R.C. § 483 applies, and other purposes. Under I.R.C. § 
1274(d)(1), the AFR is: (1) In the case of a debt instrument with 
a term not over three years, the Federal short-term rate; (2) in the 
case of a debt instrument with a term over three years but not over 
nine years, the Federal mid-term rate; and (3) in the case of a debt 
instrument with a term over nine years, the Federal long-term rate. 
I.R.C. §§ 1274(d)(2) and (3) provide special rules for selecting 
the appropriate AFR in specified circumstances. I.R.C. § 1274(d)
(2) provides that, in the case of a sale or exchange, the AFR shall 
be the lowest AFR in effect for any month in the three calendar 
month period ending with the first calendar month in which there 
is a binding contract in writing for the sale or exchange. I.R.C. § 
1274(d)(3) requires that options to renew or extend be taken into 
account in determining the term of a debt instrument. During each 
month, the Treasury Department determines the AFRs that will 
apply during the following calendar month based on the average 
market yield of outstanding marketable obligations of the United 
States with appropriate maturities. See Treas. Reg. §1.1274-4(b). 
The IRS publishes the AFRs (reproduced in the Digest) and 
adjusted AFRs for each month in the Internal Revenue Bulletin. 
I.R.C. § 1288(b)(1) provides that, in applying I.R.C. § 483 or I.R.C. 
§ 1274 to a tax-exempt obligation, under regulations prescribed by 
the Secretary, appropriate adjustments shall be made to the AFR to 
take into account the tax exemption for interest on the obligation. In 
the case of a corporation that has undergone an ownership change 
described in I.R.C. § 382(g), I.R.C. § 382 places an annual limit 
(the I.R.C. § 382 limitation) on the amount of the corporation’s 
taxable income that may be offset by certain net operating loss 
carryforwards and built-in losses, and I.R.C. § 383 places a 
limit, determined by reference to the I.R.C. § 382 limitation, on 
the amount of the corporation’s income tax liability that may be 
offset by certain tax credits and other tax attributes. Under I.R.C. § 
382(b)(1), the I.R.C. § 382 limitation generally equals the product 
of the value of the stock of the corporation immediately prior to 
the ownership change and the long-term tax-exempt rate.  I.R.C. 
§ 382(f)(1) defines the long-term tax-exempt rate as the highest of 
the adjusted federal long-term rates in effect for any month in the 
three calendar month period ending with the calendar month in 
which the ownership change occurs. I.R.C. § 382(f)(2) provides 
that the term “adjusted Federal long-term rate” means the federal 
long-term rate determined under I.R.C. § 1274(d), except that 
I.R.C. §§ 1274(d)(2) and (3) shall not apply, and such rate shall 
be properly adjusted for differences between rates on long-term 
taxable and tax-exempt obligations. T.D. 9763, 81 Fed. Reg. 
24482 (April 26, 2016).
 CHARITABLE DEDUCTIONS. The taxpayer was a limited 
liability company taxed as a partnership. The taxpayer owned 
and operated two golf courses it developed on its own land. 
The golf courses were created using loans for which the golf 
courses were collateral.  The loan agreements prohibited the 
enforcement of any oral agreements concerning the property 
without the written consent of the lenders.  The taxpayer granted 
a conservation easement on the two courses to a non-profit 
corporation.  Seven months after the transfer of the easement, 
the secured lenders both consented to subordinate their loans to 
the conservation easement holder. The IRS argued that the late 
subordination agreements violated Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(g)
(2) which requires any subordination agreements to be effective 
on the date of the easement transfer. The taxpayer attempted 
to prove that the lenders had orally subordinated their loans 
just before the easement transfers but the court rejected that 
claim because the loan agreements prohibited such agreements. 
Thus, the court held that the IRS properly denied any deduction 
for the transfer of the easement because, as of the date of the 
easement, the loans were not subordinated and the easement 
could be defeated by enforcement of the loans. RP Golf, LLC 
v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2016-80.
 The taxpayers, husband and wife, owned parcels of rural 
property zoned for agricultural use. The taxpayers transferred 
a conservation easement on both parcels to a non-profit 
organization which held several conservation easements on 
neighboring property. The easement contained an extinguishment 
provision determining the division of proceeds in the event of a 
sale or other transfer. The conservation easement grantee’s share 
was determined by the ratio of the allowed charitable deduction 
over the fair market value of the parcels without the easement. 
Treas. Reg. 1.170A-14(g)(6)(ii) provides that the grantee share 
is to be determined by the ratio of the value of the easement over 
the fair market value of the land without the easement. Because 
the easement’s calculation allowed for the grantee to receive a 
zero interest if no charitable deduction was allowed, the court 
held that the easement was not granted in perpetuity and was 
not eligible for a charitable deduction. Carroll v. Comm’r, 146 
T.C. No. 13 (2016).
 EmPLOYEE ExPENSES. The taxpayer worked for a retail 
clothing company which required its salespeople to wear the 
company’s clothing while working at the store. The taxpayer 
claimed a deduction for the cost of the clothing as unreimbursed 
employee expenses. The IRS denied the deduction. The court 
examined three criteria to determine whether the cost of clothing 
was deductible as an ordinary and necessary business expense: 
(1) the clothing is required or essential in the taxpayer’s 
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employment; (2) the clothing is not suitable for general or 
personal wear; and (3) the clothing is not so worn.  Although 
the clothing was required to be worn by the employer, the court 
upheld the denial of the deduction because the clothing was 
suitable for general and personal wear. Barnes v. Comm’r, T.C. 
memo. 2016-79.
 HEALTH INSURANCE. The IRS has published information 
for employers on filing of health insurance information returns. 
For self-insured employers, applicable large employers or health 
coverage providers, the deadlines to file information returns with 
the IRS are approaching. The deadline to provide information 
returns to employees or responsible individuals was March 31 but 
for some the deadline to file them with the IRS is just over one 
month away. This chart provides a reminder about the upcoming 
filing requirements and the 2016 deadlines:
Action Repor t ing  Due 
Dates in 2016 for…
Applicable Large 
E m p l o y e r s  – 
Including Those 
That  Are  Sel f -
Insured
S e l f - i n s u r e d 
E m p l o y e r s 
T h a t  A r e  N o t 
Applicable Large 
Employers
Coverage Providers 
– Other Than Self-
Insured Applicable 
Large Employers*
File 1094-B 
and  1095-B 
with the IRS
Not Applicable ** Paper:  May 31 
E-file: June 30*
Paper: May 31 
E-file: June 30*
File 1095-C 
and 1094-C 
with the IRS
Paper :  May 31 
E-file: June 30*
Not Applicable ** Not Applicable **
*If an employer files 250 or more Forms 1095-B or Forms 
1095-C, the employer must electronically file them with the 
IRS. Electronically filing ACA information returns requires 
an application process separate from other electronic filing 
systems. Additional information about electronic filing of ACA 
Information Returns is on the Affordable Care Act Information 
Reporting (AIR) Program page on IRS.gov and in Publications 
5164 and 5165.   
**Applicable large employers that provide employer-sponsored 
self-insured health coverage to non-employees may use either 
Forms 1095-B or Form 1095-C to report coverage for those 
individuals and other family members.  This chart applies only for 
reporting in 2016 for coverage in 2015.  In future years, the due 
dates will be different; see IRS Notice 2016-04 for information 
about these dates. Health Care Tax Tip 2016-47.
 INFORmATION RETURNS. The IRS has announced that 
it will not impose penalties under I.R.C. §§ 6721 or 6722 on 
eligible educational institutions with respect to Forms 1098-T, 
Tuition Statement, required to be filed and furnished for the 2016 
calendar year under I.R.C. § 6050S if the institution reports the 
aggregate amount billed for qualified tuition and related expenses 
on Form 1098-T instead of the aggregate amount of payments 
received as required by section 212 of the Protecting Americans 
from Tax Hikes Act of 2015 (Pub. L. No. 114-113, 129 Stat. 2242 
(2015). Ann. 2016-17, I.R.B. 2016-20.
 INNOCENT SPOUSE RELIEF. The taxpayer was self-
employed and the taxpayer’s spouse handled the accounting for 
the business. The spouse also arranged for the preparation and 
filing of the couple’s tax returns. The 2003 tax return was prepared 
and signed by the taxpayer but the spouse did not file the return 
or pay any of the taxes owed. The 2004 tax return was similarly 
prepared and filed but the return falsely claimed that estimated tax 
payments had been made so taxes were also unpaid for 2004. The 
spouse died during 2005 and the taxpayer filed the 2005 return but 
failed to pay the self-employment taxes owed.  After the spouse’s 
death, the taxpayer learned that the 2003 return was not filed and 
filed a new return but did not pay the taxes. The IRS assessed 
penalties and interest for the 2003 return and the taxpayer sought 
innocent spouse relief only from the interest and penalties up to 
the time the new return was filed.  The IRS initially argued that 
innocent spouse relief was not available for penalties and interest 
but the court rejected that argument. The IRS also argued that 
innocent spouse relief under Rev. Proc. 2013-34, 2013-2 CB. 397 
was not available because the taxes owed were attributable only 
to the taxpayer’s income. The court also rejected this argument in 
that the taxpayer was not seeking relief from the taxes owed but 
only the penalties and interest resulting from the former spouse’s 
failure to file and pay the taxes. The court noted the exception 
in Rev. Proc. 2013-34, § 4.01(7), that the attribution requirement 
could be ignored where the failure to file and pay taxes was due to 
the fraud of the non-requesting spouse. The court then discussed 
the seven factors of Rev. Proc. 2013-34 and found the majority 
were neutral as to granting relief. However, the court granted 
relief because the taxpayer had no knowledge of the failure to 
file and pay the 2003 taxes and it was equitable to provide relief 
from the penalties and interest up to the time the taxpayer filed a 
new return. Boyle v. Comm’r, T.C. memo. 2016-87.
 mOVING ExPENSES. The taxpayer owned a business 
which was subject to condemnation through eminent domain 
by a state agency for expansion of a highway. The taxpayer 
received payments from the state and federal sources and all 
the payments were used to relocate the business. The federal 
payments were subject to the federal Relocation Act in which 42 
U.S.C. § 4636 provides that funds received under the Act are not 
income for purposes of I.R.C. § 61. Thus, the IRS ruled that (1) 
the relocation payments were not taxable income to the taxpayer, 
(2) the taxpayer cannot deduct the expenses of the relocation to 
the extent of the payments made for the costs of the relocation, 
and (3) the taxpayer cannot assign any basis under I.R.C. § 
1012 to substitute equipment acquired to replace non-movable 
equipment and leasehold improvements to the extent such costs 
are reimbursed by the payments. Ltr. Rul. 201617002, Jan. 20, 
2016.
 PARTNERSHIPS
  DISREGARDED ENTITIES.  The IRS has issued proposed 
regulations that clarify the employment tax treatment of partners 
in a partnership that owns a disregarded entity. The regulations 
also affect partners in a partnership that owns a disregarded entity. 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) states that, except as otherwise 
provided, a business entity that has a single owner and is not a 
corporation under Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(b) is disregarded 
as an entity separate from its owner (a disregarded entity). 
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However, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(B) provides that an 
entity that is a disregarded entity is treated as a corporation for 
purposes of employment taxes imposed under subtitle C of the 
Code. Therefore, the disregarded entity, rather than the owner, 
is considered to be the employer of the entity’s employees for 
purposes of employment taxes imposed by subtitle C.  While 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(B) treats a disregarded entity 
as a corporation for employment tax purposes, this rule does not 
apply for self-employment tax purposes. Specifically, Treas. Reg. 
§ 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(C)(2) provides that the general rule of 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(i) applies for self-employment 
tax purposes. The regulations apply this rule in the context of a 
single individual owner by stating that the owner of an entity that 
is treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship is subject 
to tax on self-employment income. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)
(2)(iv)(D), also includes an example that specifically illustrates 
the mechanics of the rule. In the example, the disregarded entity 
is subject to employment tax with respect to employees of the 
disregarded entity. The individual owner, however, is subject to 
self-employment tax on the net earnings from self-employment 
resulting from the disregarded entity’s activities. The regulations 
do not include a separate example in which the disregarded entity 
is owned by a partnership. Even though the regulations set forth 
a general rule that an entity is disregarded as a separate entity 
from the owner for self-employment tax purposes, some taxpayers 
may have read the current regulations to permit the treatment of 
individual partners in a partnership that owns a disregarded entity 
as employees of the disregarded entity because the regulations 
did not include a specific example applying the general rule in 
the partnership context. Under this reading, which the IRS says 
was not intended, some taxpayers have permitted partners to 
participate in certain tax-favored employee benefit plans. The 
Treasury Department and the IRS note that the regulations did 
not create a distinction between a disregarded entity owned by an 
individual (that is, a sole proprietorship) and a disregarded entity 
owned by a partnership in the application of the self-employment 
tax rule. Rather, Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)(iv)(C)(2) 
provides that the general rule of Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c)(2)
(i) applies for self-employment tax purposes for any owner of 
a disregarded entity without carving out an exception regarding 
a partnership that owns such a disregarded entity. In addition, 
the Treasury Department and the IRS do not believe that the 
regulations alter the holding of Rev. Rul. 69-184, 1969-1 CB 
256, which provides that: (1) bona fide members of a partnership 
are not employees of the partnership within the meaning of the 
Federal Insurance Contributions Act, the Federal Unemployment 
Tax Act, and the Collection of Income Tax at Source on Wages, 
and (2) such a partner who devotes time and energy in the conduct 
of the trade or business of the partnership, or in providing services 
to the partnership as an independent contractor, is, in either 
event, a self-employed individual rather than an individual who, 
under the usual common law rules applicable in determining the 
employer-employee relationship, has the status of an employee. 
The rule that the entity is disregarded for self-employment tax 
purposes applies to partners in the same way that it applies to a 
sole proprietor owner. Accordingly, the partners are subject to 
the same self-employment tax rules as partners in a partnership 
that does not own a disregarded entity.  The proposed regulations 
clarify that a disregarded entity that is treated as a corporation for 
purposes of employment taxes imposed under subtitle C of the 
Code is not treated as a corporation for purposes of employing 
its individual owner, who is treated as a sole proprietor, or 
employing an individual that is a partner in a partnership that 
owns the disregarded entity. Rather, the entity is disregarded 
as an entity separate from its owner for this purpose. Existing 
regulations already provide that the entity is disregarded for self-
employment tax purposes and specifically note that the owner of 
an entity treated in the same manner as a sole proprietorship under 
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) is subject to tax on self-employment 
income. The proposed regulations apply this existing general rule 
to illustrate that, if a partnership is the owner of a disregarded 
entity, the partners in the partnership are subject to the same 
self-employment tax rules as partners in a partnership that does 
not own a disregarded entity. While the proposed regulations 
provide that a disregarded entity owned by a partnership is 
not treated as a corporation for purposes of employing any 
partner of the partnership, these regulations do not address the 
application of Rev. Rul. 69-184 in tiered partnership situations. 
The Treasury Department and the IRS request comments on the 
appropriate application of the principles of Rev. Rul. 69-184 to 
tiered partnership situations, the circumstances in which it may 
be appropriate to permit partners to also be employees of the 
partnership, and the impact on employee benefit plans (including, 
but not limited to, qualified retirement plans, health and welfare 
plans, and fringe benefit plans) and on employment taxes if Rev. 
Rul. 69-184 were to be modified to permit partners to also be 
employees in certain circumstances.  In order to allow adequate 
time for partnerships to make necessary payroll and benefit plan 
adjustments, the proposed regulations will apply on the later of: 
(1) August 1, 2016, or (2) the first day of the latest-starting plan 
year following May 4, 2016, of an affected plan (based on the 
plans adopted before, and the plan years in effect as of, May 
4, 2016) sponsored by an entity that is disregarded as an entity 
separate from its owner for any purpose under Treas. Reg. § 
301.7701-2. For these purposes, an affected plan includes any 
qualified plan, health plan, or section 125 cafeteria plan if the 
plan benefits participants whose employment status is affected 
by these regulations. T.D. 9766, 81 Fed. Reg. 26693 (may 4, 
2016).
INSURANCE
 COVERAGE.  The plaintiff insurance company sought a 
declaratory judgment that a general liability policy issued to the 
defendants did not cover an accident on their farm. The policy 
covered “any other person while operating farm tractors, self-
propelled farm machinery, or animal drawn farm vehicles or 
implements, in any of the named insured’s operations covered 
by this policy and with the permission of the insured.” The 
accident involved the defendants’ son and girl friend who died 
while operating a “four-wheeler” on the farm during a pleasure 
drive. The court noted that the insurance policy did not define 
therefore, the court held that the citations were not prohibited by 
the right-to-farm statute. Village of Black Earth v. Black Earth 
meat market, LLC, 2016 Wisc. App. LExIS 170 (Wisc. Ct. 
App. 2016).
WORKERS’ COmPENSATION
 AGRICULTURAL EmPLOYEE.  The plaintiff was employed 
at a horse facility as a horse trainer and also performed maintenance 
on the facility and horses, and other common tasks for a horse 
stable. The plaintiff was injured while riding a horse to demonstrate 
the horse’s training level. The horse facility raised and trained 
racehorses during their early training but did not train horses for 
racing and did not own racehorses. The plaintiff filed a claim for 
workers’ compensation but the horse facility did not carry workers’ 
compensation insurance. Administrative appeal decisions ruled 
that the plaintiff was employed as an agricultural worker and 
was not covered by workers’ compensation under Ky Rev. Stat. § 
342.650(5). The court noted that the workers’ compensation statute, 
Ky. Rev. Stat. § 342.0011(18), defined agriculture as “the operation 
of farm premises, including . . . the raising of livestock for food 
products and for racing purposes.”   The court cited two cases 
which held that the “feeding, housing, caring for, and training of 
horses, even if owned by another individual than the farm owner, 
has been held to be an agricultural activity.” The court noted that 
the end use of the horses, either as racehorses or lesson horses, did 
not alter the finding that the plaintiff was engaged in agricultural 
labor in caring for and training the horses at the facility; therefore, 
the plaintiff was an agricultural employee exempt from workers’ 
compensation coverage. The opinion is designated as not for 
publication. Hanawalt v. Brown, 2016 Ky. Unpub. LExIS 14 
(Ky. 2016).
AGRICULTURAL TAx 
SEmINARS
by Neil E. Harl
Due to serious family medical issues, Dr. Harl has had 
to cancel at least the first three seminars previously 
announced. Although Dr. Harl may need to cancel the 
remaining seminars, except Ames, IA, here are the 
tentative cities and dates for the seminars in 2016 at 
this time:
  August 24-25, 2016 - Quality Inn, Ames, IA
  September 15-16, 2016 - Ramkota Hotel, Sioux Falls, SD
  September 22-23, 2016 - Holiday Inn, Rock Island, IL
  October 11-12, 2016 - Atrium Hotel, Hutchinson, KS
More information will be posted on
www.agrilawpress.com.
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“self-propelled farm machinery” and held that a four-wheeler was 
self-propelled farm machinery. The court held that the phrase “any 
of the named insured’s operations covered by this policy” was 
ambiguous and there remained significant issues of fact as to the 
use of the four-wheeler by the decedent and whether the decedent 
was performing any farm task at the time of the accident. Therefore, 
the court held that summary judgment was inappropriate. Southern 
Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v Hammond, 2016 U.S. Dist. LExIS 
38555 (W.D. Ark. 2016).
 CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiff purchased Group Risk 
Income Protection (GRIP) crop insurance on a corn crop from 
the defendant. The policy provided that an indemnity payment 
would be made if the county corn yield for a crop year was more 
than 10 percent less than the expected yield. When the policy was 
purchased, the defendant’s local agent told the plaintiff that the 
yield would be based on the number of planted acres. However, the 
policy calculation was to be based on harvested acres. At the end of 
the crop year, the agent informed the plaintiff that the county corn 
yield was more than 10 percent less than the expected yield and 
told the plaintiff that an indemnity payment of over $100,000 would 
be made.  In expectation of the payment, the plaintiff quit farming 
and leased out the farm land.  However, the agent was still using 
the wrong calculation factor and the plaintiff was eventually denied 
any payment by the defendant. The plaintiff sued for negligent 
and intentional misrepresentation. The court looked at two factors 
(1) whether the plaintiff was deemed to have at least constructive 
knowledge of the terms of the policy and, if so, (2) whether the 
plaintiff reasonably relied on the agent’s erroneous statements. The 
court held that the plaintiff was charged with at least constructive 
knowledge of the policy terms because the crop insurance policy 
is regulated by federal law and regulations and, under Fed. Crop 
Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947), insureds are charged 
with the knowledge of United States laws.  The court also held 
that the plaintiff did not reasonably rely on the agent’s erroneous 
representations because the insurance policy contained sufficient 
information for showing that the representations were incorrect. 
Buckman v. Nau Country Ins., Co., 2016 U.S. Dist. LExIS 
35203 (W.D. Ky. 2016).
NUISANCE
 RIGHT-TO-FARm.  The defendant operated a slaughterhouse 
and retail meat market business within the boundary of the plaintiff 
village. The village issued 10 citations for various violations of 
village ordinances, including obstructing traffic, street pollution, 
harboring noisy animals, and unattended idling vehicles. The 
defendant appealed the citations, arguing that they were prohibited 
by the Wisconsin right-to-farm statute, Wisc. Stat.  § 823.08. The 
court held that the right-to-farm law protects “agricultural use” and 
“agricultural practice” only from nuisance actions for damages or 
abatement. The court noted that nothing in the right-to-farm law 
strips municipalities of any authority they may have to impose fines, 
including authority they may have to regulate an agricultural use 
pursuant to their police powers.  The court rejected the argument 
that the fines imposed were an indirect attempt to abate a nuisance; 
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